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SELF-INCRIMINATION: INTRODUCTION OF AN INDIVIDUAL'S BusiNESS RECORDS INTO EvIDENCE-Andresen v. Maryland, 96 S.Ct. 2737
(1976).
I.

INTRODUCTION

The fifth amendment guarantees that "[no person . . . shall
be compelled in a criminal case to be a witness against himself,"'
and as early as 1886 the United States Supreme Court held that the
prohibition against self-incrimination applies not only to admissions forced from the lips of the accused, but also to the seizure of
his personal papers and books. In Boyd v. United States,' the Court
stated: "[W]e have been unable to perceive that the seizure of a
man's private books and papers to be used in evidence against him
is substantially different from compelling him to be a witness
against himself." Thus, there is little doubt that purely personal
papers, such as diaries and letters, are protected by the fifth amendment, but to the question of whether an individual's business records are given the same protection, the Court in Andresen v.
Maryland3 answered with a resounding "no."

II.

FACTS

Peter C. Andresen was a lawyer who specialized in real estate
settlements in Montgomery County, Maryland. He was also the
incorporator, sole shareholder, resident agent, and director of
Mount Vernon Development Corporation. In 1972, a Bi-County
Fraud Unit began an investigation of real estate settlement activities in the area. Andresen's activities came under scrutiny, particularly in connection with a transaction involving "Lot 13T" in the
Potomac Woods Subdivision of Montgomery County. The investigators obtained warrants to search Andresen's law office and the office
of Mount Vernon Development Corporation for specified documents
pertaining to the sale and conveyance of Lot 13T. The searches of
the two offices were conducted simutaneously, and Andresen was
present during the search of his law office. Between two and three
percent of the files in this office were seized. A single investigator,
in the presence of a police officer, conducted a four hour search of
the corporation's office which resulted in the seizure of five percent
of the corporation's files.4
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The fifth amendment was made applicable to the states by
the fourteenth amendment in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
2. 116 U.S. 616, 633 (1886).
3. 96 S.Ct. 2737 (1976).
4. Andresen alleged that the five percent seized amounted to literally thousands of
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The investigation revealed that Andresen had defrauded
Standard-Young Associates, the purchaser of Lot 13T, by representing that the property was free of liens and that, accordingly, no title
insurance was necessary, when in fact he knew that there were two
outstanding liens on the property. Further, the lienholders threatened to foreclose their liens and thereby forced a halt to StandardYoung's construction on the property. When Standard-Young confronted Andresen, he issued, as an agent of a title insurance company, a title policy guaranteeing clear title to the property. Through
this action Andresen defrauded the insurance company by requiring
it to pay the outstanding liens.
Andresen was charged with the crime of false pretenses, based
on misrepresentations and fraudulent appropriation by a fiduciary.
Before trial he moved to suppress the seized documents; as a result
of the subsequent suppression -hearing, several documents were returned-only one of the corporation's files was not returned, and
eleven of the 28 items seized from the law offices were returned.
After a jury trial, Andresen was found guilty upon five counts
of false pretenses and three counts of fraudulent misappropriation
by a fiduciary and was sentenced to eight concurrent two year prison
terms. The Maryland Court of Special Appeals reversed four of five
false pretenses counts, but affirmed the remaining convictions. 5
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.'

III.

DECISION OF THE COURT

Andresen based his appeal on the grounds that the warrants
violated his fourth amendment rights by authorizing a general
search, and that the introduction into evidence of his business records violated his fifth amendment privilege against selfincrimination. The Supreme Court disagreed with Andresen, and in
a seven-to-two decision held that the search of Andresen's offices
and seizure of his records violated neither the fourth7 nor the fifth
amendment.
papers which later filled several file cabinet drawers in the office of the state's attorney. Brief
for Petitioner at 19, Andresen v. Maryland, 96 S.Ct. 2737 (1976).
5. 24 Md. App. 128, 331 A.2d 78 (1975).
6. 96 S.Ct. 36 (1975).
7. The warrants included an exhaustive list of particularly described documents, but
also included the phrase "together with other fruits, instrumentalities and evidence of crime
at this [time] unknown." 96 S.Ct. at 2748. Andresen contended that the inclusion of this
phrase made the warrants so general as to render them impermissibly broad and thereby
violative of his fourth amendment rights.
The Court held that this phrase was not fatal to the warrants because the phrase was
not a separate sentence and must be read in conjunction with the list:
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NOTE

Andresen's contentions concerning his fifth amendment rights
can be separated into two theories:'first, that the fifth amendment
prohibitions against compulsory self-incrimination apply to the production of business records as well as personal papers; and second,
that the self-incrimination clause prohibits the seizure of personal
business records by warrant in the same manner that it prohibits
the production of the same papers by means of a subpoena.
Andresen based his first contention on the principle set forth
in Boyd v. United States' that the seizure of a man's private books
and papers to be used in evidence against him is no different than
compelling him to be a witness against himself. The Court held that
this contention was based upon dicta and implication, and that the
Boyd decision did not compel suppression of Andresen's business
records? As further support for its conclusion, the Court cited its
decision in Fisher v. United States10 which held that the production
by an attorney of his client's tax records did not violate the fifth
amendment. Andresen, like the client in Fisher, was not required
to say or do anything. The search was conducted by law enforcement personnel, and the documents were authenticated at trial by
a handwriting expert, not by Andresen. "Any compulsion of the
[W]e agree . . . that the challenged phrase must be read as authorizing only the
search for and seizure of evidence relating to "the crime of false pretenses with respect
to Lot 13T." ... The challenged phrase is not a separate sentence. Instead, it appears
in each warrant at the end of a sentence containing a lengthy list of specified and
particular items to be seized, all pertaining to Lot 13T. We think it clear from the
context that the term "crime" in the warrants refers only to the crime of false pretenses
with respect to Lot 13T . . . . The warrants . . . did not authorize the executing
officers to conduct a search for evidence of other crimes but only to search for and seize
evidence relevant to the crime of false pretenses and Lot 13T. Id. at 2748-49 (citations
and footnotes omitted).
Justices Brennan and Marshall submitted separate dissents stating that the business
records should have been suppressed because they were seized pursuant to impermissibly
general warrants. Justice Brennan felt that the warrants were general because, although the
majority construed the questioned clause as being limited to evidence pertaining to the crime
of false pretenses in the sale of Lot 13T, the Court's construction of the warrants was not
available to the investigators at the time they executed the warrants. Therefore the rule that
"fals to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the
warrant," Id. at 2754, quoting Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965), was violated:
The question is not how those warrants are to be viewed in hindsight, but how they
were in fact viewed by those executing them. The overwhelming quantity of seized
material that was either suppressed or returned to petitioner is irrefutable testimony
to the unlawful generality of the warrants. Id.
Justice Marshall agreed that the records were seized pursuant to an impermissibly general warrant and therefore should have been suppressed. Accordingly, he would not consider
Andresen's allegations of violations of his fifth amendment privilege.
8. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
9. 96 S. Ct. at 2744.
10. 96 S.Ct. 1569 (1976).
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petitioner to speak, other than the inherent psychological pressure
to respond at trial to unfavorable evidence, was not present.""
Therefore, the Court reasoned, Andresen was not compelled to be a
witness against himself.
Andresen's second theory was based on the reasoning of the
2 which
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Hill v. Philpott,1
held
that the introduction into evidence of a taxpayer's personal books
and records should be disallowed on self-incrimination grounds,
even though this evidence had been seized pursuant to a valid
search warrant. The Hill rationale was that the taxpayer could have
asserted his fifth amendment rights had the same evidence been
produced by means of a subpoena. The Seventh Circuit stated that
in practice the result to the accused is the same, whether he be
forced to supply the evidence himself via a subpoena or whether the
evidence be the product of a search pursuant to a warrant, because
in either case the accused is the unwilling source of the evidence,
which is a violation of the fifth amendment prohibition that an
accused shall not be compelled to be a witness against himself. 3 The
Court, however, noted that Hill is the minority position and relied
instead upon the reasoning of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in
United States v. Blank." The Blank court stated that there was a
valid distinction between records sought by subpoena and records
sought by a warrant; the difference between the two methods of
obtaining evidence was one of compulsion. Compulsion is present in
the case of subpoenas because the person receiving the subpoena
must, by his own response, identify the documents delivered to the
court as the ones described in the subpoena. The search warrant
involves no such element of compulsion because the accused is not
required to do anything. 5
The Court also relied upon the principle of Johnson v. United
States" that a party is privileged from producing evidence but not
from its production. This premise is the basis of the distinction
between the fifth amendment protection against production of documents by subpoena, and the lack of such protection against the
same documents being seized by warrant; that is, although the fifth
amendment may protect an individual from complying with a subpoena for personal documents in his possession because the very act
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

96 S.Ct. 2737, 2745.
445 F.2d 144 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971).
445 F.2d at 149, quoting Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 306 (1921).
459 F.2d 383 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972).
Id. at 385.
228 U.S. 457 (1913).
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of production may constitute a compulsory authentication of in-

criminating evidence, a seizure of the same evidence by law enforcement officers using warrants does not require the accused to aid in
the discovery, production, or authentication of incriminating evidence.
Justice Brennan disagreed with the majority's holding on the
self-incrimination issue, citing his concurring opinion in Fisher to
the effect that the fifth amendment forbids the government to compel testimonial matter "that might tend to incriminate him, provided it is a matter that comes within the zone of privacy recognized
by the Amendment to secure to the individual 'a private inner sanctum of individual feeling and thought.""' Therefore, evidence
within this zone of privacy cannot be compelled by warrant or
subpoena. "I can perceive no distinction of meaningful substance
between compelling production of such records through subpoena
and seizing such records against the will of the petitioner."' 8
IV.

ANALYSIS

HistoricalBackground-Boyd and Its Progeny: Destruction of
the Convergence Theory
At first blush it appears that the Court's decisions in Andresen
and Fisher leave little of the Boyd ruling alive; therefore, a closer
inspection of the Boyd decision and the following cases concerning
the Boyd rule is in order at this point.
The government believed that Boyd, with the intent to defraud
the government, had imported thirty-five cases of polished glass
into the United States without paying the duty thereon. The District Court for the Southern District of New York issued a production order for Boyd to bring forth an invoice for twenty-nine cases
of glass, in order to show the quantity and quality of the glass previously imported. Boyd objected to the validity of the order but
nevertheless produced the invoice. After an unfavorable judgment,
he brought a fifth amendment self-incrimination challenge to the
production of the invoice. The Supreme Court agreed with Boyd's
contention, holding that a compulsory production of private books
and papers is compelling the owner of such to be a witness against
himself within the meaning of the fifth amendment, and is the
equivalent of an unreasonable search and seizure within the bounds

A.

17.
18.

96 S.Ct. at 2750, quoting Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 327 (1973).
96 S.Ct. at 2750.
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of the fourth amendment." The Court's reasoning was based upon
the interrelation between the fourth and fifth amendments:
We have

. .

noticed the intimate relation between the two Amend-

ments. They throw light on each other. For the "unreasonable
searches and seizures" condemned in the Fourth Amendment are
almost always made for the purpose of compelling a man to give
evidence against himself, which in criminal cases is condemned in the
Fifth Amendment; and compelling a man "in a criminal case to be a
witness against himself", which is condemned in the Fifth Amendment, throws light on the question as to what is an "unreasonable
search and seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment."
The Boyd decision established two important principles. First,
there should be no distinction between evidence obtained by search
warrant and evidence obtained by subpoena. On this point the
Court stated:
[Iln regard to the Fourth Amendment, it is contended that. . . the
order in the present case . . .is free from constitutional objection

because it does not authorize the search and seizure of books and
papers, but only requires the defendant.

. .

to produce them ....

It is true that certain aggravating incidents of actual search and
seizure, such as a forcible entry into a man's house and searching
amongst his papers, are wanting.

.

. ; but it accomplishes the sub-

stantial object of those acts in forcing from a party evidence against
himself.

. .. [T]herefore, .

.

. a compulsory production of a man's

private papers to establish a criminal charge against him, or to forfeit
his property, is within the scope of the Fourth Amendment

.

.. in

all cases in which a search and seizure would be; because it is a
material ingredient, and effects the sole object and purpose of search
2
and seizure. '

Secondly, Boyd established what could and could not be seized
within the bounds of the fourth amendment. Contraband and stolen
goods could be seized, but private books and papers could not.
Contraband and stolen goods could be seized because the government, not the individual, was entitled to possession of these items;
the government was not entitled to possession of a man's private
books and papers. The Boyd Court felt that the members of Congress did not regard the seizure of stolen goods as unreasonable;
therefore, searches for and seizures of contraband and stolen goods
are not "embraced within the prohibition of the amendment. ' 22
19. 116 U.S. at 634-35.
20. Id. at 633.
21. Id. at 621-22.
22. Id. at 623.
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Thirty-five years later, the Boyd rule was modified by Gouled
v. United States.23 While the Boyd decision held that private books
and papers were absolutely protected by the fourth and fifth amendments, the Court in Gouled maintained that private books and papers deserved no more protection than other forms of property and
that there is no special sanctity in papers which would render them
immune from search and seizure if the requisites of a warrant are
met." The Court in Gouled established the "mere evidence" rule;
that is, search warrants "may not be used as a means of gaining
access to a man's house or office and papers solely for the purpose
of making search to secure evidence to be used against him in a
criminal or penal proceeding. . . ."21 Thus, the papers which could
not have been seized under the Boyd rationale would also be protected under the Gouled rule if they were seized merely for evidentiary purposes. Articles seized merely for evidentiary purposes and
introduced at trial would, therefore, violate both the fourth and fifth
amendments.
The Boyd and Gouled decisions can be summed up as ascribing
to the same basic theorem:
Although the emphasis on the importance of "papers" changed,
Gouled maintained Boyd's central proposition: the private liberty of
an individual is so important that it outweighs the claimed necessities of law enforcement in seizing papers or other property for the sole
purpose of using them in evidence against him. Boyd and Gouled
could not
thus guaranteed a zone of privacy which the government
2
breach to discover items of mere evidentiary value.
Six years after the Gouled .decision, the Court in Marron v.
United States2 expanded the scope of the types of items which
could permissibly be seized. The Marron Court permitted warrantless seizure of a ledger and bills of account used in an unlawful
liquor business. The ledger and bills were held to be permissibly
seized because they were "part of the outfit or equipment actually
used to commit the crime," and they were in the arrestee's "imme'28
diate possession and control.
Thus, after the Marron decision, the items which could be permissibly seized, given probable cause, were: (1) fruits of crime, (2)
23. 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
24. Id. at 309.
25. Id.
26. The Search and Seizure of Private Papers: Fourth and Fifth Amendment
Considerations, 6 Lov. L.A.L. REv. 274, 280 (1973).
27. 275 U.S. 192 (1927).
28. Id. at 199.

Published by eCommons, 1977

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2:2

contraband, (3) instruments, outfit, or equipment used to commit
a crime. The fourth amendment, however, was still considered as
prohibiting the search for and seizure of "mere evidence."
The mere evidence rule was abolished by the Court in Warden
v. Hayden." The Court in Warden held that it is lawful to seize mere
evidence; as long as the items seized are evidence of a crime, there
need be no concern as to whether it falls into one of the above three
classes because there is no language in the fourth amendment to
support the distinction between mere evidence and instrumentalities, fruits of crime or contraband. The fourth amendment assures
the "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects," 30 and this provision applies without regard to the use
to which any of these things are put. The Warden Court held that
this "right of the people" is certainly not related to the mere evidence limitation:
Privacy is disturbed no more by a search directed to a purely evidentiary object than it is by a search directed to an instrumentality,
fruit, or contraband. A magistrate can intervene in both situations,
and the requirements of probable cause and specificity can be preserved intact. Moreover, nothing in the nature of property seized as
evidence renders it more private than property seized, for example,
as an instrumentality; quite the opposite may be true. Indeed the
distinction is wholly irrational, since, depending on the circumstances, the same "papers and effects" may be "mere evidence" in one
3
case and "instrumentality" in another. '
Thus, after the Warden decision, even mere evidence could be
seized, but the Warden decision did not permit carte blanche seizure of any and every type of evidence. Rather, the Warden Court
recognized that there may still be a valid self-incrimination claim
regarding the seizure of testimonial evidence:
The items of clothing involved in this case are not "testimonial" or
"communicative" in nature, and their introduction therefore did not
compel respondent to become a witness against himself in violation
of the Fifth Amendment. . . .This case thus does not require that
we consider whether there are items of evidential value whose very
nature precludes them from being the object of a reasonable search
32
and seizure.
The earlier cases show a strong interrelation between the fourth
29.

387 U.S. 294 (1967).

30.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

31. Id. at 301-02.
32. Id. at 302-03.
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and fifth amendments, and, while a violation of one was not
necessarily considered an automatic violation of the other, this implication was present. Thus, the Boyd Court stated that seizing
evidence or compelling the production of evidence which forced the
owner to be a witness against himself in violation of the fifth amendment would constitute an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the fourth amendment. The Marron Court stated that it has
been a long-standing rule that the fifth amendment protects everyone against incrimination by the use of evidence obtained via a
33
search or seizure which is violative of his fourth amendment rights.
The Andresen Court held that this "convergence theory" had
been discredited by later opinions, citing Fisher v. United States,3
and further held, in effect, that the fourth and fifth amendments
were separate and distinct amendments which offer separate and
distinct protections. The Court stated that in the earlier cases, the
basis for the inadmissibility of the evidence seized was a violation
of the fourth amendment. The unlawfulness of the search and seizure supplied the compulsion of the accused which was a prerequisite to the invocation of his fifth amendment rights. 35 The

Court held that there was no such compulsion against Andresen
because he was not asked to say or do anything, the records seized
contained statements that he had voluntarily comitted to writing,
the records were authenticated at trial by a handwriting expert-not by Andresen; therefore, the Court reasoned, the only compulsion upon Andresen to speak was the "inherent psychological
pressure to respond at trial to unfavorable evidence. . .. -3,Therefore, since there was no compulsion, there was no violation of Andresen's fifth amendment rights, regardless of Andresen's claim of violations of his fourth amendment rights.
B. Warrants Versus Subpoenas
Prior to the Andresen decision there was a divergence among
the federal courts of appeals over whether the fourth amendment
prohibits the seizure by warrant of documentary evidence which
could not be constitutionally compelled by means of a subpoena.
The distinct minority position was that evidence which could not
be compelled by subpoena could not be seized by means of a war33.
34.
35.
36.

275 U.S. at 194.
96 S.Ct. 1569 (1976).
96 S.Ct. at 2744.
Id. at 2745.
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rant.3 7 The reasoning of the minority was that although it makes no
difference how the evidence got to the courthouse, it was still attributed to the defendant because "the jury knows the books and records belong to the defendant and the entries he has made therein
speak against him as clearly as his own voice. '38 The minority felt
that compulsion against the accused was present in the case of
either subpoena or warrant, and this reasoning was aptly stated by
J. Seth in his dissenting opinion in Shaffer v. Wilson:
The difference [is] between a prospective defendant standing at the
door watching the agents haul out eighteen cartons of records (there
he is "passive" because the warrant says he must be), as compared
to response to a subpoena where he hauls the eighteen cartons out the
door himself. The "compulsion" is present in both cases. In one case
the "defendant" interprets the words in the subpoena; in the other
the agent interprets the words in the warrant. This should not lead
to the great difference in constitutional protection which the Govern-

ment urges here .

.

.3

The overwhelming majority of federal courts of appeals held
that there was a distinction between seizing evidence by a warrant
and compelling the production of evidence by a subpoena:"° there
was compulsion and self-incrimination in the case of a subpoena,
but no such constitutional violations in the case of a warrant. The
subpoena requires the accused to identify the documents and personally bring them before the court, and these acts may constitute
acts of self-incrimination; whereas a warrant requires the accused
to do nothing which might incriminate him.
The Andresen decision adopted the view of the majority of federal courts of appeals and settled the conflict among the circuits.
Once the convergence theory was abolished, it follows that the distinction between evidence seized by a warrant and compelled by a
subpoena would be upheld, because the fourth amendment protection is against unreasonable searches and seizures, while compulsion and self-incrimination are the evils protected against by the
fifth amendment. "Compulsion upon the person asserting the fifth
amendment privilege is an important element of the privilege, and
'prohibition of compelling a man . . . to be a witness against him37. Vonder Ahe v. Howland, 508.F.2d 364 (9th Cir. 1975); Hill v. Philpott, 445 F.2d 144
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 .(1971).
38. Hill v. Philpott, 445 F.2d at 149.
39. Shaffer v. Wilson, 523 F.2d 175, 184 (10th Cir. 1975) (Seth, J., dissenting).
40. Shaffer v. Wilson, 523 F.2d 175 (10th Cir. 1975); United States v. Blank, 459 F.2d
383 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972); Taylor v. Minnesota, 466 F.2d 1119 (8th Cir.
1972); United States v. Scharfman, 448 F.2d 1352 (2d Cir. 1971).
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self is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to
extort communications from him' . . ."
In United States v. White,'2 the Court stressed that the purpose
of the fifth amendment privilege was to prevent compulsion against
the accused, and that the privilege is essentially a personal one,
designed to prevent the use of legal process to force incriminating
evidence from the lips of the accused or to force him to produce and
authenticate any incriminating personal documents.43
While there must be some compulsion against the accused before his fifth amendment privilege attaches, there was no such compulsion against Andresen. The search was pursuant to a valid warrant and the evidence, which was no doubt incriminating, was
seized by law enforcement personnel-no evidence was forced from
the lips of Andresen, nor was he required to produce and authenticate any documents which might incriminate him. Since there was
no compulsion present, the Andresen case truly does "fall within the
principle stated by Mr. Justice Holmes: 'a party is privileged from
producing the evidence but not from its production.' ""
C.

PersonalPapers Versus Business Records: The Right to Privacy

From the above rationale, the logical opposing argument would
be that to seize any documents or books, one need only to obtain a
warrant. The Andresen decision, however, does not go that far.
It must be stressed that the evidence sought in Andresen was
business records, not personal papers dealing with the intimate and
private life of the accused. Business records could hardly be categorized as an element of an individual's "private inner sanctum of
individual feeling and thought"'45 which is protected by the selfincrimination privilege. Purely personal papers, such as diaries and
letters which fall within that sanctum, are still protected by the fifth
amendment. Andresen, in dealing with business records only, does
not open wide the door to governmental seizure of private books and
papers; on the contrary, the Andresen Court limited its decision to
discussion of the seizure of business records:
[Plermitting the admission of the records in question does not convert our accusatorial system of justice into an inquisitorial system.
"The requirement of specific charges, their proof beyond a reasonable
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328 (1973) (citation omitted).
322 U.S. 694 (1944).
Id. at 698.
96 S.Ct. at 2745, quoting Johnson v. United States, 228 U.S. 457, 458 (1913).
Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. at 327.
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doubt, the protection of the acused from confessions extorted through
whatever form of police pressures, the right to a prompt hearing
before a magistrate, the right to assistance of counsel, to be supplied
by government when the circumstances make it necessary, the duty
to advise the accused of his constitutional rights-these are all characteristics of the accusatorial system and manifestations of its demands." Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 54 (1949). None of the attributes is endangered by the introduction of business records "independently secured through skillful investigation." Ibid. Further, the
search for and seizure of business records pose no danger greater than
that inherent in every search that evidence will be elicited by inhumane treatment and abuses."
The distinction between permitting the seizure of business records and not permitting the seizure of personal papers can be based
upon the accused's expectation of privacy as to those papers. The
accused has a much greater expectation of privacy in his personal
correspondence than he would in his business records, which may
be kept by him simply because the law requires that he keep such
records. The fifth amendment protects the right to privacy, and the
Supreme Court in Couch v. United States7 defined this right to
privacy: "By its very nature, the privilege [against self-incrimination] is an intimate and private one. It respects a private inner
sanctum of individual feeling and thought and proscribes state
intrusion to extract self-incrimination."'" The Andresen decision
recognized that the fifth amendment protects privacy "to some
' but felt that this protection is not all-encompassing:
extent,"49
[Tihe Court has never suggested that every invasion of privacy violates the privilege. Indeed, .

.

. unless the incriminating testimony

is "compelled", any invasion of privacy is outside the scope of the
Fifth Amendment's protection ....
Thus it appears that the Andresen decision retreats somewhat from
the broader privacy protection espoused in Couch, but the fifth
amendment right to privacy is nevertheless still recognized and protected.
V.

CONCLUSION

There are three important results of the Andresen decision, the
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

96 S.Ct. at 2746 (emphasis added).
409 U.S. 322 (1973).
Id. at 327.
96 S.Ct. at 2747.
Id., quoting Fisher v. United States, 96 S.Ct. 1569, 1575 (1976).
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first of which is the abolition of the convergence theory of the fourth
and fifth amendments. The Court held that the two amendments
are separate and distinct, and there does not have to be a violation
of one in order to find a violation of the other.
Secondly, the Court settled the controversy among the federal
courts of appeals as to whether there is to be a distinction made
between evidence compelled by a subpoena which forces the accused by his own acts to present incriminatory evidence and evidence seized by a valid warrant which has no such element of compulsion.
Thirdly, the Court retreated from a broad fifth amendment
protection of privacy but still recognized that such a right to privacy
does exist.
The Andresen decision is limited to business records and is
consistent with the theory that there must be some form of compulsion before the fifth amendment self-incrimination privilege applies; the Court recognized that the self-incrimination privilege
adheres to the person, not to the evidence. The entire concept of the
fifth amendment self-incrimination privilege was aptly stated by
Justice Powell:
It is important to reiterate that the Fifth Amendment privilege is a
personal privilege: it adheres basically to the person, not to information that may incriminate him . . . . The Constitution explicitly
prohibits an accused to bear witness "against himself"; it necessarily
does not proscribe incriminating statements elicited from another."
The Andresen case was therefore correctly decided, and the retreat
in constitutional protections is not in the area of the selfincrimination privilege, but rather in the fifth amendment right to
privacy.
Charles McKinley Surber, Jr.
51.

Couch v. United States, 409
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